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Abstract
We study “opaque” selling in multiproduct environments – a marketing practice in
which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important charac-
teristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will
always use opaque selling, but it is not first-best optimal to do so. However, opaque
selling might be used at the constrained optimum (with the monopolist’s pricing be-
havior taken as given). For linear disutility costs, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer
a single opaque product.
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1 Introduction
We study “opaque” selling in multiproduct environments – a marketing practice in which
sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of
their products hidden until after purchase. Opaque selling is particularly prevalent and
growing in the travel/tourism industry.1 Online intermediaries such as Hotwire.com and
Priceline.com engage in opaque selling by concealing hotel names and locations or airlines
and departure/arrival times. Economycarrentals.com, an online car rental intermediary,
reveals the name of the car rental company only after the customer pays for the service.
Other venues where opaque selling is employed include Japanese “fukubukuro” or “omakase”,
subscription beer or wine boxes, etc.2
Focusing on market segmentation (and thereby price discrimination) as a motive for
withholding information, we investigate in this paper the equilibrium and welfare properties
of opaque selling. We consider a standard Hotelling model with a continuum of consumers
who differ with respect to their ideal tastes and a monopoly seller. In the baseline model,
we assume that the seller is equipped with two base products that are located at the two
end-points of the unit line [0, 1]. We then extend the analysis to the case of many products.
Besides offering each base product individually for sale, the firm can also design and sell any
number of lotteries that award one of the base products as the final prize, but the consumer
cannot observe the outcome until after purchase. The questions we address are: When can
the seller profit from selling opaque products? How are base product prices affected? How
many opaque products does the seller offer concurrently? Does opaque selling improve social
welfare?
The literature on opaque selling is quite recent. The price discrimination motive for
a monopolist is addressed in Jiang (2007) and Fay and Xie (2008) in a symmetric two-
product Hotelling framework. They find the conditions under which offering a given opaque
1Online spending on travel products in the US alone totalled $103 billion in 2012, which constituted
roughly 40% of all US online spending on retail products (excluding auctions). Source: www.comscore.com.
2“Fukubukuro” is a Japanese New Year custom in which merchants make grab bags filled with unknown
random contents and sell them for a substantial discount. “Omakase” is a form of Japanese dining in which
guests leave themselves in the hands of a chef in choosing their meals.
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product improves profits. In a similar setting, Balestrieri, Izmalkov and Leao (2017) solve
the optimal selling mechanism allowing non-uniform pricing and an endogenous number of
lotteries. They show that, depending on the shape of the transportation cost function, the
monopolist may offer a single lottery, a continuum, or lotteries with positive probabilities
of no sale. Thanassoulis (2004) and Pavlov (2010) reach similar results in a random utility
setting.3
The main elements of the above models are similar to ours. We contribute to this liter-
ature by offering a tractable framework that relies heavily on graphical tools and economic
reasoning. Building on the methodology we developed in Anderson and Celik (2015, hence-
forth AC), we provide a simple graphical characterization of a monopolist’s optimal strategy
using the elementary tools of virtual valuation curves. Given a set of base products, a mo-
nopolist will offer only those opaque products that extend the upper envelope of virtual
valuations. When the transportation costs are linear, it is optimal to offer a single opaque
product that offers the same expected utility to all consumers. This approach greatly simpli-
fies the standard mechanism design approach used in Balestrieri et al. (2017) while allowing
for possibly asymmetric base products and non-uniform consumer distributions.4 Moreover,
we are able to show that this result extends to multiple base products when the monopolist
is free to offer any number of lotteries. To the best of our knowledge, none of the above
papers consider lotteries of more than two products. Finally, our methodology enables us to
show that opaque selling is never first-best optimal, but might improve welfare in a second-
best sense. We are not aware of any earlier papers that offer any welfare analysis of opaque
products.
3Besides market segmentation, firms may use opaque selling to: 1) expand market size by offering a larger
product line, 2) dispose left-over capacity through an intermediary without damaging brand name, and 3)
secure against fluctuations in demand. Fay (2004), Shapiro and Shi (2008) and Tappata (2012) focus on
motive 1 along with market segmentation, whereas Jerath et al. (2010) address a combination of motives 2
and 3 in a two-period model with two single-product capacity-constrained firms.
4In this respect, our contribution can be viewed similar in spirit to that of Bulow and Roberts (1989) who
revisited the mechanism design approach of Myerson (1981) by applying the analysis of standard monopoly
third-degree price discrimination.
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2 Baseline model
Consider a market with a unit mass of consumers and a single firm (M) equipped with two
horizontally-differentiated base products, i = 1, 2. Besides offering each product individually
for sale, M can also sell lotteries that award one of the two products as the final prize. In
the latter case, consumers do not observe the outcome until after purchase. Each consumer
demands a single unit of the product yielding the highest expected utility, provided this is
non-negative. M’s problem is to design lotteries and choose prices of its products.
We describe each consumer by a unidimensional taste parameter θ, distributed over [0, 1]
according to a twice differentiable c.d.f. F (θ). Assume the corresponding density f (θ) is
log-concave. This also ensures that F (θ) and 1− F (θ) are log-concave. The valuations are
in the standard linear-cost Hotelling form: u1 (θ) = R1 − t1θ and u2 (θ) = R2 − t2 (1− θ),
where Ri, ti >> 0 for i = 1, 2. We allow Ri and ti to differ across the two products to
allow for asymmetric configurations. In particular, R1 6= R2 captures any inherent quality
differences across products. We assume identical constant marginal costs of production,
which we normalize to zero. Hence, each ui (θ) measures cost-normalized net valuation.
In all derivations below, we assume that max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} > 0 for all θ. This means
that it is socially optimal to serve all consumers with one of the products. A necessary and
sufficient condition to ensure this holds is R1
t1
> 1− R2
t2
. We also assume that, in the absence
of lotteries, the monopolist offers both base products in strictly positive quantities. This
requires that R1 and R2 are not too apart from each other. The precise restriction will be
specified in the next subsection.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis - no lotteries
We first solve the optimal product selection, pricing and welfare properties without opaque
selling. These results extend AC, who only considered vertical differentiation. Let pi denote
the price of product i. Suppose for now that the market is fully covered. There will then be
a unique marginal consumer θˆ ∈ [0, 1] indifferent between the two products, and M’s profits
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are
pi = p1F (θˆ) + p2(1− F (θˆ)). (1)
The choice of prices must obey:
u1(θˆ)− p1 = u2(θˆ)− p2 = 0. (2)
Hence, consumer θˆ gets zero utility. Otherwise M could increase both prices and still serve
all consumers. Plugging p1 = u1(θˆ) and p2 = u2(θˆ) into (1):
pi = u1(θˆ)F (θˆ) + u2(θˆ)(1− F (θˆ)).
Differentiating pi with respect to θˆ, we get in any interior solution
u1(θˆ) + u
′
1(θˆ)
F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
= u2(θˆ)− u′2(θˆ)
1− F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
. (3)
Each side of this equality measures the underlying “virtual” valuation for product 1 and
2, respectively, evaluated at θ = θˆ. This is no coincidence; our analysis in AC was also
based on conditional stand-alone inverse demands and the corresponding marginal revenue
curves. Here, because of horizontal differentiation, we use virtual valuations. Define by φi (θ)
consumer θ’s virtual valuation for product i:
φi (θ) =
{
ui (θ) +
F (θ)
f(θ)
u′i (θ) , u
′
i (θ) < 0
ui (θ)− 1−F (θ)f(θ) u′i (θ) , u′i (θ) > 0
. (4)
As in the theory of auctions, φi (θ) here measures the highest surplus M can extract from
a θ-type consumer. Log-concavity of f (θ) implies that F
f
is increasing and 1−F
f
decreasing
in θ. Under linear transportation costs, this ensures that each φ′i (θ) has the same sign as
the corresponding u′i (θ).
Graphically, it suffices to draw φ1(θ) and φ2(θ), and find the point θˆ where they intersect.
The corresponding prices to support this cutoff are then given by the constraints in (2), p1 =
u1(θˆ) and p2 = u2(θˆ). This is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 below. To ensure that both
products are sold in strictly positive quantities, we need φ1(0) > φ2(0) and φ1(1) < φ2(1).
This requires R1 > R2 − t2
(
1 + 1
f(0)
)
and R2 > R1 − t1
(
1 + 1
f(0)
)
, respectively. So, if
R2 ≥ R1 for instance, then we need that R2−R1t2 < 1 + 1f(0) .
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Figure 1. Equilibrium with no opaque 
products
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As in AC, this result can be generalized to any number of products: simply draw the
virtual valuations for all products and find the upper envelope. M chooses its product line
and the corresponding prices according to this envelope.5 Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2. Three products
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??? ???
The above analysis also goes through when base utilities are not sufficiently high. In
this case, φ1(θ) and φ2(θ) will not have an interior intersection and M will find it optimal
5Specifically, for a given set of available products N = {1, ..., n}, M will include product i in its product
line if and only if φi (θ) > max {maxj 6=i φj (θ) , 0} for some θ ∈ (0, 1).
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to serve a strict subset of consumers. Then, there will be two cutoff consumer locations,
θˆ1 < θˆ2, such that consumers to the left of θˆ1 purchase product 1, consumers to the right
of θˆ2 purchase product 2 and those in between stay out of the market. Equilibrium cutoff
points in this case are given by φ1(θˆ1) = φ2(θˆ2) = 0 with the resulting prices p1 = u1(θˆ1) and
p2 = u2(θˆ2).
First-best efficiency:
A product is socially optimal to offer for sale if, under marginal cost pricing, it generates the
highest positive surplus for some consumers. In our framework, the set of socially optimal
products corresponds to the upper envelope of valuation functions. If ui (θ) belongs to this
upper envelope, then it is socially optimal to consume product i. However, M’s equilibrium
behavior is governed fully by the upper envelope of virtual valuations. As a result, first-best
product selection might differ from what M offers in equilibrium.
Consider the example depicted in Figure 3. Only product 2 should be consumed at the
social optimum since u2 (θ) > u1 (θ) for all θ. However, since φ1(θ) and φ2(θ) intersect at an
intermediate point, M offers both products for sale. In other words, there is a market failure
in terms of product selection.
Figure 3. When one product 
dominates
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Product 2Product 1
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Even when M offers the socially optimal set of products, M’s pricing might distort welfare
via consumption inefficiencies. In Figure 1, for instance, while it is socially optimal that all
consumers to the left of the intersection of u1 (θ) and u2 (θ) consume product 1, only those
to the left of θˆ consume it in equilibrium. As we will see next, opaque selling can restore
some of this welfare loss by improving product match.
2.2 Opaque selling
We now allow M to offer opaque products along with the two base options. First, we consider
a single lottery Lα that delivers products 1 and 2 with probabilities α ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − α,
respectively. Consumers know α and are expected utility maximizers. M sets prices p1, p2
and pLα for the three products and consumers self-select. The expected valuation of lottery
Lα for a consumer located at θ is
uLα (θ) = αu1 (θ) + (1− α)u2 (θ)
= αR1 + (1− α) (R2 − t2)− (αt1 − (1− α) t2) θ.
In a fully-covered market configuration in which M sells all three products in positive
quantities, there will be two threshold consumers, θˆ1 < θˆ2, such that consumers with θ < θˆ1
purchase product 1, consumers with θ > θˆ2 purchase product 2 and those in between purchase
the lottery. Thus,
pi = p1F (θˆ1) + pLα(F (θˆ2)− F (θˆ1)) + p2(1− F (θˆ2)),
where prices satisfy
uLα (θ)− pLα ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θˆ1, θˆ2],
u1(θˆ1)− p1 = uL(θˆ1)− pLα ,
u2(θˆ2)− p2 = uL(θˆ2)− pLα .
Given that uLα (θ) < max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} for any α ∈ (0, 1), the lottery is never the
most preferred product for any consumer. In other words, a social planner would never
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use opaque selling in a first-best allocation. However, we show below that φLα (θ) is always
part of the upper envelope of virtual valuation functions as long as max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} > 0
for all θ. Hence, it will always be offered in market equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} > 0 for all θ, then, for any α ∈ (0, 1), it is always
optimal to offer lottery Lα for sale.
Proof. Suppose first that φ1(θ) and φ2(θ) have an interior intersection, so φ1(θˆ) = φ2(θˆ) > 0.
Assume, without loss of any generality, that αt1 ≤ (1− α) t2 so that u′Lα (θ) ≥ 0 (the opposite
case is symmetric). Then,
φLα (θ) = uLα (θ)−
1− F (θ)
f (θ)
u′Lα (θ)
= αR1 + (1− α) (R2 − t2)− (αt1 − (1− α) t2)
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
)
= αφ1 (θ) + (1− α)φ2 (θ) + αt1 1
f (θ)
.
Evaluated at θ = θˆ, it follows that φLα(θˆ) = φ1(θˆ) + αt1
1
f(θˆ)
> φ1(θˆ). This means that the
opaque product is part of the upper envelope of virtual valuations. Thus, from the analysis
in the previous section, it is optimal to sell the opaque product. It is also easy to see that
φ1 (0) = R1 > φLα (0) and φ2 (1) = R2 > φLα (1), so all three products will be offered in
equilibrium.
Next, suppose that φ1(θ) and φ2(θ) do not have an interior intersection. In this case,
there will be two cutoff consumer locations, θˆ1 < θˆ2, given by φ1(θˆ1) = φ2(θˆ2) = 0. Assume
again that αt1 ≤ (1− α) t2 so that u′Lα (θ) ≥ 0. Evaluated at θ = θˆ2, we have φ2(θˆ2) =
R2 − t2(1− θˆ2)− 1−F (θˆ2)f(θˆ2) t2 = 0. This implies that θˆ2 −
1−F (θˆ2)
f(θˆ2)
= 1− R2
t2
. Then,
φLα(θˆ2) = αR1 + (1− α) (R2 − t2)− (αt1 − (1− α) t2)
(
θˆ2 − 1− F (θˆ2)
f(θˆ2)
)
αR1 + (1− α) (R2 − t2)− (αt1 − (1− α) t2)
(
1− R2
t2
)
= αt1
[
R1
t1
−
(
1− R2
t2
)]
> 0,
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where the strict inequality follows from max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} > 0. Thus, φLα(θˆ2) > φ2(θˆ2) = 0,
which implies that the opaque product is part of the upper envelope of virtual valuations.
By offering an opaque product, the monopolist is able to increase its profits via better
market segmentation. The consumers in the middle do not have strong preferences for either
product, so it is optimal for M to offer a different product to these consumers. This, in turn,
enables M to charge a higher price to those consumers with a stronger preference for either
product.6
Next, using a nice graphical property that we first explored and utilized in AC, we show
that even when M can offer any number of opaque products with differing probabilities,
it will choose to offer only a single one: the one with probabilities such that the resulting
expected valuation is independent of θ.
Proposition 2 It is optimal for M to offer only a single opaque product that delivers product
1 with probability α = t2
t1+t2
and product 2 with probability 1− α.
Proof. The proof follows from the striking property that two valuation functions with
slopes of same sign cross each other at a height of η > 0 if and only if their corresponding
virtual valuation functions also cross at a height of η. To see this, take a lottery Lα with
αt1 ≤ (1− α) t2 so that u′Lα (θ) ≥ 0. Suppose u2 (θ) = uLα (θ) = η > 0 for some θ. Then, at
such θ,
R2 − t2 (1− θ) = α (R1 − t1θ) + (1− α) (R2 − t2 (1− θ))
⇔ R1 − t1θ = R2 − t2 (1− θ)
⇔ θ = R1 −R2 + t2
t1 + t2
.
Hence,
η = R1 − t1R1 −R2 + t2
t1 + t2
=
t2R1 + t1R2 − t1t2
t1 + t2
.
6Having two base products is crucial for this result. In their seminal paper, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983)
show that a single-product monopolist cannot profit from using lotteries and that the optimal mechanism is
a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
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Similarly, if φ2(θ˜) = φLα(θ˜) for some θ˜, then it must be that
R2− t2 + t2
(
θ˜ − 1− F (θ˜)
f(θ˜)
)
= αR1 +(1− α) (R2 − t2)− (αt1 − (1− α) t2)
(
θ˜ − 1− F (θ˜)
f(θ˜)
)
⇔ θ˜ −
1− F
(
θ˜
)
f
(
θ˜
) = αR1 − α (R2 − t2)
αt1 + αt2
.
This, then, implies that at any such crossing,
φ2(θ˜) = φLα(θ˜) = R2 − t2 + t2
(
θ˜ − 1− F (θ˜)
f(θ˜)
)
= η.
Thus, virtual valuations cross at the same height as the corresponding valuations.
With this property in hand, it is easy to prove the result. First note that, all uLα (θ) cross
through the intersection point of u1 (θ) and u2 (θ) since uLα (θ) = αu1 (θ) + (1− α)u2 (θ).
Suppose that u1 (θ) and u2 (θ) intersect at θ = θ¯ ∈ (0, 1). Take any two lotteries Lα1 and
Lα2with α1t1 ≤ (1− α1) t2 and α2t1 ≤ (1− α2) t2 so that so that u′Lα1 (θ) , u′Lα2 (θ) ≥ 0. Since
u2 (θ), uLα1 (θ) and uLα2 (θ) cross each other at θ¯, their virtual valuations φ2(θ), φLα1 (θ) and
φLα2 (θ) must cross each other at a single point where their height is u2
(
θ¯
)
. In other words,
there is a common pivotal point to the right of θ¯ with a height of u2
(
θ¯
)
where φ2(θ) and
all φLα (θ) with φ
′
Lα
(θ) ≥ 0 cross each other. The upper envelope of these virtual valuations
will then contain only φ2 (θ) and φLα˜ (θ) where α˜ =
t2
t1+t2
. The latter is the virtual valuation
for the lottery uLα˜ (θ) =
t2R1+t1(R2−t2)
t1+t2
, which offers the same gross utility to all consumers
(u′Lα˜ (θ) = 0). The argument is symmetric for φ1(θ) and all φLα (θ) with φ
′
Lα
(θ) ≤ 0. Hence,
besides the two base products, it is optimal to offer only the lottery with α = t2
t1+t2
.
If, on the other hand, u2 (θ) > u1 (θ) for all θ while φ1(0) > φ2(0), then offering only the
lottery with α = t2
t1+t2
is still optimal, but the monopolist will not sell the first base product
at all since its virtual valuation will be dominated with that of the lottery. Hence, the
possibility of opaque selling can induce the seller to stop offering a particular base product
for sale, which can have important welfare consequences (see section 4). An example is
illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 4. Multiple lotteries
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Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 4. Tracing through the upper envelope of all virtual
valuations, we get only the flat part besides φ1 and φ2 – the part associated with the lottery
Lα where α =
t2
t1+t2
. In other words, the optimal lottery equates the virtual valuations – and
thus marginal profits – of all three products M sells. By offering a single opaque product
which is independent of θ, M makes sure it leaves no (expected) surplus to its consumers.
Since this enables a higher markup on products 1 and 2, M has no incentive to offer any
other lotteries.
Our graphical solution method is valid only when transportation costs are linear. Using a
mechanism design approach, Balestrieri et al. (2017) also show that offering a single opaque
product is optimal when the transportation costs are linear; otherwise, depending on the
shape of the transportation costs, the monopolist offers a continuum of opaque products, or
lotteries with positive probabilities of no sale. However, they restrict their analysis to two
symmetric base products (i.e., R1 = R2 and t1 = t2) and uniform consumer distribution.
Our approach greatly simplifies their analysis for linear transportation costs and extends
it to asymmetric base products as well as non-uniform consumer distributions. Moreover,
as we show in the next subsection, we can extend our results to the case of multiple base
products.
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3 Many products
Suppose now that M has many products and can design and sell any number of lotteries
involving two or more products. We restrict attention to products that are located either
at 0 or 1. Consider, for instance, the example depicted in Figure 2, where products 1 and 2
are located at 0 and product 3 at 1. Products 1 and 2 differ by their base utilities as well
as transportation costs (R1 > R2 and t1 > t2), which can be thought of as product 1 having
higher durability but offering more niche properties.7 In this setting, would M offer multiple
lotteries in equilibrium? Would it offer lotteries of three products along with lotteries of two
products?
In Figure 2, u2 (θ) and u3 (θ) cross each other at a higher point than where u1 (θ) and u3 (θ)
cross. We show below that, under linear transportation costs, it is optimal for M to offer
only a single opaque product that delivers products 2 and 3 with the underlying probabilities
t3
t2+t3
and t2
t2+t3
such that the resulting valuation function is flat. This configuration and the
resulting market segmentation are depicted in Figure 5 below. The double-lined boundary
is the upper envelope of all virtual valuations.
Proposition 3 When M has three or more products, each located at either 0 or 1, it is
optimal to offer only a single opaque product that delivers products j and k with probabilities
α = tk
tj+tk
and 1 − α, where products j and k are the two products whose intersection point
is the highest among all product pairs with opposite slopes.
7We can also construct such products from the standard Lancasterian characteristics model. Suppose
each product characteristic is a 2-tuple (αj , βj) ∈ R2 and each product x is a collection of a subset of given
characteristics. If a θ-type consumer purchases product x, her gross utility is u (θ;x) =
∑
j∈x
αj +
∑
j∈x
βjθ,
where θ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, each characteristic consists of two vertical attributes. Suppose there are only
three characteristics, (α1, β1) = (R,−2t), (α2, β2) = (−t, t) and (α3, β3) = (0, 3t), and let product 1 have
characteristic 1 only, product 2 has characteristics 1 and 2, and product 3 has characteristics 1 and 3. Then,
u1 (θ) = R− 2tθ,
u2 (θ) = (R− t)− tθ,
u3 (θ) = (R+ t)− t (1− θ) ,
which corresponds to the example depicted in Figure 2. See Anderson and Celik (2018) for further details
of this approach.
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Figure 5. Equilibrium with three products
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Proof. The proof directly follows from the property that was utilized in AC and in Propo-
sition 2 above (i.e., the property that two valuation functions with slopes of same sign cross
each other at the same height as their corresponding virtual valuation functions do). Con-
sider the product configuration depicted in Figure 5. First, we know from Proposition 2
that any other lottery of products 2 and 3 will be strictly dominated by lottery L23 that
delivers products 2 and 3 with probabilities α = t3
t2+t3
and 1 − α. Second, any lottery of
products 1 and 3 will be strictly dominated by lottery L23 since u2 (θ) and u3 (θ) cross each
other at a higher point than where u1 (θ) and u3 (θ) cross. Next, observe that any lottery
of products 1 and 2 will be unprofitable to offer because the virtual valuation of any such
lottery will be strictly bracketed between φ1 (θ) and φ2 (θ), thus lying below the upper en-
velope max {φ1 (θ) , φ2 (θ)}.8 Finally, any lottery LA that delivers all three products with
strictly positive probabilities will also be strictly dominated because, regardless of its slope,
uLA (θ) < u2 (θ) at the point where u1 (θ) = u2 (θ) as well as where u2 (θ) = u3 (θ). So,
if u′LA (θ) ≤ 0, then it must be that uLA (θ) < max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ) , uL23 (θ)}. Similarly, if
u′LA (θ) ≥ 0, then it must be that uLA (θ) < max {uL23 (θ) , u3 (θ)}. Then, by the property of
AC, φLA (θ) will be strictly below the upper envelope max {φ1 (θ) , φ2 (θ) , φL23 (θ) , φ3 (θ)}.
8This observation is more generally valid in the setting of AC with multiple products. Hence, under linear
valuations, opaque selling with vertically differentiated base products is suboptimal.
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An example is depicted in Figure 6 below. These arguments apply equally to any number
of products that are located either at 0 and 1.
Figure 6. Single lottery with three products
0 1
???(?)???(?)
We are not aware of any earlier analysis of opaque selling with multiple base products.
Whether a monopolist would offer multiple lotteries or any lotteries of more than two prod-
ucts in this setting are important questions and could generally be difficult to solve in a
mechanism design framework. Our tractable graphical approach provides a simple and in-
tuitive answer.
4 Welfare properties of opaque selling
We have argued that a social planner would never use opaque selling in a first-best allocation
with marginal-cost pricing. However, first-best is rarely achievable. Here, we address the
welfare implications of opaque selling in the second-best solution where the planner takes
the seller’s pricing behavior as given. Consider Figure 7 below. Without opaque selling,
the monopolist sells product 1 to consumers with θ ≤ θˆ1 and product 2 to consumers with
θ ≥ θˆ2, where θˆ2 > θˆ1. Thus, the market is not fully covered, but each product is consumed
in strictly positive quantities (thus satisfying our restrictions that max {u1 (θ) , u2 (θ)} > 0,
φ1(0) > φ2(0) and φ1(1) < φ2(1)).
14
From a first-best perspective, product 1 should not be offered at all. But M has incentives
to sell it because of price discrimination motives. Suppose now that M also offers an opaque
product. By Proposition 2, the optimal opaque product to offer will be the one with α =
t1
t1+t2
, which corresponds to the flat valuation indicated as uL (θ) = φL (θ) in the figure.
Since this is above φ1(θ) for all θ, M will no longer offer product 1 for sale. φL(θ) and
φ2(θ) intersect at θˆ, so M will now serve the whole market, selling the opaque product to
consumers with θ < θˆ at a price of pL = uL(θˆ) and product 2 to consumers with θ ≥ θˆ at a
price of p2 = u2(θˆ).
Figure 7. Possible welfare 
improvement
0 1
??(?)
??(?)
?????
Loss
Gain
??(?) = ??(?)
???
??(?)
At the extensive margin, this will bring welfare gains because of the increased market
coverage. In contrast, since M will increase p2, there will be welfare losses at the inten-
sive margin. To be more precise, all consumers who previously pruchased product 1 will
switch to the opaque product, implying a welfare gain of
∫ θˆ1
0
(uL (θ)− u1 (θ)) dF (θ) thanks
to better expected product match. Those consumers who initially stayed out of the mar-
ket are now willing to purchase the opaque product, which brings expected welfare gains of∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
uL (θ) dF (θ). Thus, the total welfare gain is
∫ θˆ2
0
uL (θ) dF (θ)−
∫ θˆ1
0
u1 (θ) dF (θ). At the
intensive margin, those consumers with θ ∈ (θˆ2, θˆ) switch from product 2 to the opaque prod-
uct because of the new prices under opaque selling, which, due to decreased product match,
causes a welfare loss of
∫ θˆ
θˆ2
(u2 (θ)− uL (θ)) dF (θ). Overall, each of these might dominate,
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so the effect is unclear. In Figure 7, we depict an example with F (θ) = θ, where the gains
(blue area) dominate the losses (green area). Hence, it is quite viable that opaque selling
raises social welfare by increasing market participation and improving product match.9
As a specific example, take u1 = R − θ and u2 = R + tθ, where R < t1+t to ensure
that θˆ2 > θˆ1. Equlibrium values of θˆ1 and θˆ2 are easily found by φ1 = R − 2θˆ1 = 0 and
φ2 = R− t+2tθˆ2 = 0, which give θˆ1 = R2 and θˆ2 = t−R2t . The optimal opaque product to offer
is the one with α = t
1+t
and 1−α = 1
1+t
, which implies uL =
t
1+t
(R− θ) + 1
1+t
(R + tθ) = R,
and hence φL = uL. The equlibrium value of θˆ is then given by φ2 = φL, implying θˆ =
1
2
.
Now, looking at Figure 7, we can calculate the welfare gains and losses as
Gains ≡ θˆ2R− θˆ1
2
(R + u1(θˆ1)) =
(t−R)R
2t
− 3R
2
8
=
(4t− 7R)R
8t
,
Losses ≡ θˆ − θˆ2
2
(u2(θˆ2)−R + u2(θˆ)−R) = R
4t
(
t−R
2
+
t
2
)
=
(2t−R)R
8t
.
Hence, welfare gains dominates the losses if 4t− 7R > 2t−R, or equivalently if R < t
3
. An
example that satisfies these restrictions is R = 0.3 and t = 1.
5 Conclusion
We study opaque selling in a Hotelling setting using graphical tools to find the optimal
solution to a multi-product monopolist’s problem. We show that it is always profitable
to offer an opaque product as long as it is socially optimal to serve all consumers with a
product. For linear disutility costs, a monopolist offers a single opaque product even when
it could offer many. Opaque selling is socially suboptimal, but might improve welfare in a
second-best sense taking the monopolist’s pricing behavior as given.
We can generalize some of these results. For instance, profitability of opaque selling for
the monopolist (Proposition 1) extends to more general (non-linear) transportation costs.
However, characterization of equilibrium with opaque products becomes less tractable. Nor-
9Varian (1985) showed that for social welfare to increase with price discrimination, output must increase
too. This is also true in our model. If, without opaque selling, the monopolist finds it optimal to serve the
whole market, then offering an opaque product will lower the social welfare.
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mative results also go through in a more general setting: opaque selling is always socially
suboptimal, but might improve welfare in a second-best sense.
We have assumed identical marginal costs. If they are different, the monopolist might
have incentives to deliver the less-costly product to those consumers who purchased the
opaque product, thus dishonoring the underlying lottery. Since consumers would antici-
pate this from the beginning, opaque selling will then fail. However, credible commitment
power (e.g., announcing the lottery in the beginning and sticking to it thereafter) or binding
capacity constraints will restore the result.
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